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Abstract
Deliberation is commonly assumed to be a central characteristic of humans’ higher cognitive functions, and the responses
following deliberation are attributed to mechanisms that are qualitatively different from lower-level associative or affectively
driven responses. In contrast to this perspective, the current article’s aim is to draw attention to potential issues with making
inferences about mechanisms of deliberation based on characteristics of the observed decision outcomes. We propose that a
consequence of deliberation is to simply reduce the likelihood of expressing immediately available (dominant) responses. We
illustrate how this consequence of deliberation can provide a parsimonious explanation for a broad range of prior research on
decision-making. Furthermore, we discuss how the present perspective on deliberation relates to the question of how the cognitive
system implements nondominant responses based on associative learning and affective prioritization rather than voluntary
decisions. Beyond the present article’s theoretical focus, for illustrative purposes, we provide some empirical evidence (three
studies, N = 175) that is in line with our proposal. In sum, our theoretical framework, prior empirical evidence, and the present
studies suggest that deliberation reduces the likelihood of expressing dominant responses. Although we do not argue that this is
the only consequence or mechanism regarding deliberation, we aim to highlight that it is worthwhile considering this minimal
consequence of deliberation as compared with certain higher cognitive functions in the interpretation of deliberation outcomes.
Keywords Cognitive control and automaticity . Decisionmaking . High order cognition . Deliberation
Deliberation—contemplating the pros and cons of a required
decision—is an often-observed activity in the process of
decision-making and response selection. Furthermore, delibera-
tion is assumed to be a central characteristic of humans’ higher
cognitive functions, and deliberation outcomes are often attrib-
uted to qualitatively different mechanisms thanmere associative
thinking. The aim of our present article is to present a different
perspective. We postulate that a minimal consequence of delib-
eration is reducing the likelihood of expressing immediately
available, dominant responses. From this perspective, delibera-
tion serves the function of delaying responses and allowing
alternative, non-dominant responses to become activated and
eventually expressed. We will discuss two major consequences
of our perspective: (1) We will highlight a methodological
shortcoming in research on deliberation and decision-making:
Inferring the mechanisms of deliberation (cognitive processes)
on the basis of characteristics of decision outcomes potentially
confounds these outcomes with characteristics of the decision
task. (2) Within a broader context, we will discuss the conse-
quences arising from the present perspective for the question of
whether it is necessary to assume qualitatively different mecha-
nisms for so-called automatic and controlled behavior.
The article is structured as follows. In the first part, we
present a description of the processes that are responsible for
decreasing the likelihood of expressing dominant responses
following deliberation. In the second part, the empirical part,
we demonstrate this minimal consequence of deliberation in
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an incentivized risk decision-making paradigm. By inducing
different degrees of deliberation, we show that more deliber-
ation leads to a decreased likelihood of expressing dominant
responses in favor of available alternatives. The third part, the
discussion, consists of two sections detailing the main conclu-
sions drawn from the present perspective regarding methodo-
logical issues when investigating deliberation and apparent
qualitative differences between automatic and controlled
behavior.
In the following introduction section, we will outline our
theoretical perspective based on the following three arguments:
(A) Following an event, there is a sequential unfolding of re-
sponse options with dominant responses being accessible closer
in time to the triggering event than others. (B) The activity level
of early accessible, dominant responses decays during response
delays, giving way for alternative (less dominant) responses to
reach the execution threshold. (C) Deliberation induces re-
sponse delays that provide the minimal conditions (described
in A and B) to decrease the likelihood of expressing dominant
responses in the respective decision context.
Sequential unfolding of response options
(defining dominant responses)
For a given event, some responses are more likely to reach the
execution threshold earlier than other responses. These readily
available responses are what we refer to as dominant
responses (sometimes called prepotent, intuitive, or automatic
responses). There is a range of mechanisms that are responsi-
ble for making some responses dominant. Most importantly,
some responses are more quickly initiated because of an indi-
vidual’s repeated learning experience of executing a response
in a given situation (i.e., associative learning, habits; Wood &
Rünger, 2016). Besides this learning-based mechanism, some
responses are more quickly expressed because in some way
they are compatible with the characteristics of a prior or cur-
rent simultaneous event (e.g., repetition priming, Logan,
1990; response priming by distractors, Eriksen & Eriksen,
1974; effector–response compatibility, Simon & Small,
1969). Furthermore, responses are dominant because they
are in line with certain affective dispositions (e.g., approach
or avoidance orientation; Chen & Bargh, 1999). Finally, even
in complex problem-solving tasks, probably due to a combi-
nation of the previously mentioned mechanisms, the problem
at hand can have characteristics that make certain responses
more readily available than others (e.g., bat and ball paradigm;
Trémolière, De Neys, & Bonnefon, 2014).
Borrowing from the language of diffusion models (e.g.,
Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016), the listed mecha-
nisms lead to an earlier evidence accumulation start or a quicker
evidence accumulation for specific responses. These responses
then cross the execution threshold prior to alternative responses
with a later starting point or a slower accumulation of evidence.
Consequently, the expression of less dominant responses
should depend on delays (see Simpson & Riggs, 2007) that
allow responses with a later starting point or slower evidence
accumulation to reach the execution threshold. In the next sec-
tion, we will focus on such delays.
Activation levels of dominant responses
decay over time
What happens to immediately accessible, dominant responses
if responding quickly is prevented? A series of studies with
children (age 3 to 4 years old) deals with this question and
indicates that the activation level of dominant responses de-
cays if they are not acted upon. When the children were pre-
sented with a task that favored a wrong response, they had
trouble not executing this dominant but wrong response (e.g.,
Simpson & Riggs, 2007). However, in trials in which the
children’s opportunity to respond was delayed by a few sec-
onds, they were less likely to execute the dominant (wrong)
response, but instead executed the alternative response more
often, and thereby committed fewer errors (e.g., Diamond,
Kirkham, & Amso, 2002; Simpson & Riggs, 2007; Simpson
et al., 2012).
Importantly, Simpson et al. (2012) tested two competing
hypotheses of what enables 3-year-old to 4-year-old children
to respond more correctly after the induced delay: using the
delay for active computation of alternatives (Diamond et al.,
2002) versus passive decay of dominant-response activation
(Simpson&Riggs, 2007). Simpson and colleagues again used
a setup in which the dominant response was the wrong re-
sponse and induced a short response delay. Importantly, the
response delay was filled with a mild distraction task (i.e.,
children’s thoughts were occupied) or the children were not
distracted by an additional task (i.e., children could use the
time to “calculate” a response). The results showed that both
delay conditions resulted in fewer errors (i.e., fewer dominant
responses) as compared with a no-delay condition. This result
is surprising from an active computation hypothesis because
children who were distracted and could not use the delay for
active computation also committed fewer errors. However, it
is in line with the idea that inducing a delay results in the
decay of a dominant but not executed response (see also
Diamond, 2013).
To sum up the argument so far, response options unfold in
a sequential order. Inducing a response delay increases the
likelihood that early available (dominant) responses start
decaying after they have reached their typical activation max-
imum. Delaying responses provides the chance for the activa-
tion level of less-dominant responses to rise beyond that of the
dominant response. The evidence summarized so far pertained
to induced response delays in laboratory settings. In the next
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section, we will argue that deliberation may provide these
response delays in an everyday context.
Deliberation delays behavioral responses
In the present research, we define deliberation as the act of
focusing attention on the different aspects of a current event
and the information activated in memory by that event.
Deliberation in the present research is not limited to the acti-
vation of specific cognitive procedures (i.e., a deliberative
mindset; Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990) or specific
content like analytical reasoning (e.g., Evans, 2006). We con-
ceptualize it as a broad cognitive response that can be initiated
like any other behavioral, cognitive, or affective response (see
also Doerflinger, Martiny-Huenger, & Gollwitzer, 2017).
Consequently, by this definition, deliberation entails delaying
any immediate, dominant behavioral responses. We propose
that such a delay provides the time for the decay of the acti-
vation level of the originally dominant response and at the
same time for alternative, less dominant responses to emerge.
In other words, whereas deliberation outcomes are typically
attributed to specific cognitive mechanisms of deliberation,
we propose that the delay alone that is induced by deliberation
already has the potential to influence decision outcomes.
In the following section, we will illustrate an issue arising
from our perspective for investigating the relation between
deliberation and decision-making. The context of decision-
making paradigms discussed in the next section allows for a
simplification of the presented perspective. The available de-
cision options are typically clearly defined for the decision
task at hand. Thus, for the time being, we will omit the ques-
tion of where alternative, less dominant responses come from
(see the Controlled Processes versus Giving Associations the
Time to Unfold section for more details on this issue) and
focus on typical decision-making paradigms that include re-
sponse alternatives as the only options from which the re-
search participant can choose.
Predictions: Decision context
and deliberation outcomes
The relevance of our proposal for research on the relation
between deliberation and decision-making arises from the pre-
dictions that can be made about a systematic relation between
the structure of a decision context and the outcome of delib-
eration. If deliberation systematically decreases the likelihood
of expressing dominant responses, predictions about the out-
come of deliberation are contingent on the dominant response
in each context and the available alternative options. The dom-
inant response aspect depends on the involved psychological
mechanisms listed in the first section of this article (e.g.,
associative learning). The alternative option is especially rel-
evant in scientific investigations because alternative options
are defined by the researcher, often in the form of a single
alternative.
Imagine a study in which participants are presented with
two options (A and B), and Option A is the more dominant
response in the given context. According to our present rea-
soning, the induction of deliberation should decrease the like-
lihood of choosing Option A. Per the design of the study
(Option B is the only alternative), deliberation would lead to
an increased likelihood of expressing Option B. Thus, what-
ever aspects characterize Option B—it could be the norma-
tively more rational, more goal-oriented, or the fairer
response—it would be more likely to be selected and lead to
differences between a deliberation and no-deliberation condi-
tion. However, based on our present perspective, it is unjusti-
fied to infer characteristics of the induced deliberation from
the characteristics of the observed expression of Option B.
This is because the increased likelihood of choosing Option
B is a consequence of the context (i.e., what is the dominant
response and what alternative option did the researcher imple-
ment) rather than the inherent features of Option B. In the
general discussion, we review relevant prior research and re-
interpret its conclusions based on our present perspective. In
the next section, however, wewill first present novel empirical
evidence for the proposed consequences of deliberation.
Empirical part
Our present theoretical perspective can be applied to a
broad range of decisions and behavioral responses,
allowing for a wide range of possible empirical tests.
Our current empirical studies are intended to exemplify
an instance in which deliberation reduces the likelihood
of expressing dominant responses. We adopted an
established decision-making paradigm from De
Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, and Dolan (2006) in
which participants choose between risky and safe op-
tions that are framed in terms of losses or gains. This
paradigm establishes a decision context with specific
characteristics, allowing to test whether deliberation re-
duces the likelihood of expressing dominant responses.
First, the decision paradigm includes an affectively
driven dominant response (avoiding losses; De Martino
et al., 2006) and a single, less dominant, alternative
response. Second, the paradigm allows including expect-
ed value as an indicator of normative decision quality.
Critically, it is possible to manipulate the decision qual-
ity and the dominant-response factor independently from
each other. Thus, the effect of deliberation on dominant
responses and normative decision quality can be tested
without the danger of confounding both factors.
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Decision paradigm
In incentivized decisions, our participants had to choose be-
tween a safe and a risky option. Whereas choosing the safe
option had the guaranteed result of receiving a small share of a
predefined resource (i.e., points that translated into monetary
disbursement), choosing the risky option resulted in a high
probability of receiving nothing, but also a low probability
of receiving a large share of the resource. Thus, participants
repeatedly chose between a sure but small and a large but risky
return. This basic task allowed for further manipulations to
induce and measure response dominance and expected value.
Inducing dominant responses (context framing)
To induce dominant responses and to quantify the number of
actually executed dominant responses, we used the so-called
framing effect. Framing effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)
are systematic response biases depending on how a context is
presented, even when there is no factual difference. A com-
mon framing is to present outcomes of a decision as losses
versus gains for the decision maker. The effect of this differ-
ence in the framing is that people show a higher tendency to
choose risky options whenever decision outcomes are framed
as losses rather than gains (reviewed by Steiger & Kühberger,
2018).
There is evidence that this framing effect is affectively
driven (De Martino et al., 2006). Apparently, the aversion of
losing something drives decisions towards the option that en-
tails at least a chance of not losing—even if the probability of
this option occurring is rather low. Thus, we implemented
loss-frame and gain-frame decision trials and operationalized
the size of the framing effect—the higher proportion of choos-
ing the risky option under a loss frame compared with a gain
frame—as the degree of dominant responding. Based on our
theoretical framework, we predicted that a higher degree of
deliberation results in a smaller framing effect—fewer
expressed dominant responses.
Varying expected value
To include a second, potentially decision-relevant factor that
should be treated independently from the dominant responses,
we implemented an expected valuemanipulation. If outcomes
are dependent on certain probabilities, expected value reflects
the most likely average outcome after a considerable amount
of trials. Thus, expected value is the probabilistic value of a
given choice. We manipulated expected value on a trial-by-
trial basis; for some trials, the expected value was higher for
choosing the safe option; for other trials, the expected value
was higher for the risky options, and for other trials, both
options had the same expected value. From the perspective
that participants aimed at maximizing their monetary outcome
(something that was reinforced by the task instructions), trial-
by-trial choice of the option with the higher expected value
can be interpreted as a normatively good choice. We opera-
tionalized the expected-value effect—the higher proportion of
choosing the risk response in trials with a higher expected
value for the risky option compared with trials with a higher
expected value for the safe option—as an indicator of decision
quality from a normative outcome-maximizing perspective.
Critical for the present theoretical perspective, the sec-
ondary factor of expected value was independent from the
framing factor (response-dominance manipulation). That
is, the dominant response in each trial was equally often
of high, low, or equal expected value. From perspectives
that relate deliberation or reflective processing to more
normative, rule-based, and consequential decision-
making (as compared with biased, associative, and
experiential; reviewed by Evans & Stanovich, 2013), it
could be predicted that the induction of deliberation (in
our case “thinking carefully”) increased participants’ con-
sideration of the normative, rule-based, and consequential
information (i.e., expected value). Thus, a higher degree
of deliberation should result in a higher frequency of re-
sponses that are aligned to their expected value. In con-
trast, our present theoretical perspective merely predicts
that deliberation decreases the likelihood of expressing
dominant responses. As the expected-value factor does
not provide an obvious dominant response, our theoretical
framework does not make specific predictions about the
consequences of deliberation on the expected value of the
responses taken.
The hypothesis that the framing but not the expected-value
manipulation affects response dominance is based on the def-
inition of dominant responses, as previously provided in the
Sequential Unfolding of Response Options section:
Responses driven by the framing effect are based on process-
ing easily detectable cues (e.g., “You will lose . . . .”) and their
potential affective consequences (e.g., De Martino et al.,
2006). Responses driven by expected value instead require
the valuation of outcomes based on calculations that integrate
numeric information about absolute values and probabilities.
We expect the easily detectable cues of the framing manipu-
lation and the affective responses triggered by the framing to
be more quickly accessible than the information provided by
calculating the expected value. As the dominant-response fac-
tor is a continuum, expected value may provide a dominant
response in the absence of other comparatively more domi-
nant decision-relevant factors. In our present studies, howev-
er, we assume that response dominance is induced by the more
easily comprehensible framing information (e.g., “You will
lose . . . .”). Therefore, the reduced likelihood of expressing
dominant responses following deliberation should emerge
more strongly for the framing than for the expected-value
factor.
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The induction of deliberation and framing effects
Previous studies have investigated the amount of information
processing (e.g., more or less deliberation) in relation to the
framing effect—with conflicting results. Whereas some stud-
ies found smaller framing effects following more processing
(e.g., Takemura, 1994), other studies found larger framing
effects (e.g., Igou & Bless, 2007). The procedures used to
manipulate the amount of processing varied considerably be-
tween these studies, including the manipulation of motivation,
requesting justification, or imposing lengthy time delays (>30
seconds; Igou & Bless, 2007). The inconsistent results are not
easily resolved given the diverse deliberation-induction
methods. Each method induces additional aspects that go be-
yond our present conceptualization of deliberation (e.g., justi-
fication could induce post hoc reasoning instead of the
intended deliberat ion in advance of a decision).
Consequently, we approached the induction of deliberation
with a planning procedure that has previously proven to be
effective (Doerflinger et al., 2017); it has the advantage of
keeping motivation and the actual decision task consistent
between low and high deliberation conditions.
In line with research on if–then action planning (i.e.,
implementation intentions; Gollwitzer, 1999, 2014), partici-
pants were asked to adopt an if–then plan in the form of “If I
make a decision, then I will think carefully” (inducing delib-
eration) or “If I make a decision, then I will respond sponta-
neously” (inducing less deliberation). There is evidence that
such if–then planning can be used to vary the depth of think-
ing (e.g., Bieleke, Gollwitzer, Oettingen, & Fischbacher,
2017; Doerflinger et al., 2017; Wieber, Thürmer, &
Gollwitzer, 2015) and amplify information acquisition
(Bieleke, Dohmen, & Gollwitzer, 2020). In sum, we present
three studies in which we manipulated the degree of deliber-
ation by using a planning procedure. In general, we predicted
that a higher induced degree of deliberation results in a smaller
framing effect (i.e., leading to fewer dominant responses).
Studies 1–3: Framing effect and deliberation
Method
Design and participants
All three studies followed a 2 (framing [within]: gain vs. loss)
× 3 (expected value [within]: safe vs. equal vs. risky) × 2 or 3
(deliberation [between]; see Table 1 for the specific levels)
design. In addition, Studies 2 and 3 included an emphasis
factor (within: high vs. low). Participants made binary choices
between a safe and a risky option. Proportion of risk responses
and decision times were used as the dependent variables.
Participants in Study 1 were high-school students in their last
or second to last year, and participants in Studies 2 and 3 were
university students (see Table 1 for participant-related statis-
tics).We set the number of participants per condition based on
prior studies on the effects of deliberation in the context of
gain–loss framings. Takemura (1994) and Igou and Bless
(2007) performed their analyses on 25–45 participants per
condition. Notably, in these prior studies, each participant
provided only a single data point (i.e., one response to one
decision scenario). In our present research, each participant
provided 54 (Study 1) or even 78 (Studies 2 & 3) data points.
Because of this significantly larger data basis per participant,
we set the targeted sample size to 25 participants per between-
participants condition. No analyses on the data of the respec-
tive study were conducted before the full reported sample was
collected.
Procedure
Participants were informed that the study was about making
good decisions in a computerized negotiation about a certain
piece of land. The main decision in each trial was deciding
between a safe or a risky option. Figure 1 illustrates an exam-
ple of a loss-framed decision: Choosing the safe option led to
receiving a small part (4 hectares, due to losing 16) of the total
negotiated piece (endowment; 20 hectares) in the exemplary
trial. Choosing the risky option could result in either of two
outcomes: With a relatively low probability (30%) partici-
pants could receive a larger part (16 hectares, due to losing
4) from the current endowment, otherwise (70%) they re-
ceived nothing (0 hectares, due to losing 20).
Participants were told that the displayed probabilities
reflected the likelihood with which the negotiation opponent
would accept or reject the participant’s choice. With regard to
the differences between the decision trials, participants were
informed that the size of the overall resource (endowment),
the probability of the hypothetical negotiation opponent
accepting the offer (probabilities of the risk option), and which
option (safe or risky) had a higher expected value (i.e., statis-
tically higher outcome likelihood) would vary from trial to
trial. Finally, participants were informed that two (Study 1)
or four (Studies 2 and 3) decision trials were randomly chosen
at the end to calculate their monetary reward for participating
in the study (1 hectare of land = 1 point = 0.25 EUR). The last
part of the general information was an example illustrating
how the task would be presented on the screen, including
annotations on the meaning of the different parts of informa-
tion provided.
Deliberation manipulation
Following the general instructions, the induction of the deliber-
ation manipulation started (this part was skipped in the control
conditions). Participants were asked to commit to a way of
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making their decisions by reading and memorizing an if–then
response plan. As it is common in if–then planning, the response
plans started with specifying a certain situational cue. This cue
was different for each Study. The plans started with “If I have to
make a decision, . . . .” (Study 1), “If it is a [blue/orange] situ-
ation, . . . .” (Study 2), and “If I see an exclamation mark, . . . .”
(Study 3). Details about the meaning of these triggers is ex-
plained in the Emphasis section below. Importantly, in all three
studies, we used the same formulation about the intended
response characteristics. To facilitate spontaneous responding,
the response plans stated “. . . , then I will respond fast and
spontaneously.”To facilitate deliberate responding, the response
plan stated “. . . , then I will think carefully.”
Participants were instructed to take some time to memorize
the plan. Participants could decide by themselves howmuch time
they spent on doing this, and they pressed a button when they
were ready to continue. On the next instruction page, they were
instructed to write down the plan on a provided sheet of paper
Fig. 1 Layout of the information presented in a loss frame decision trial
Table 1 Descriptive participant statistics and design details
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
N (female) 53 (28) 53 (35) 69 (53)
Age M (SD) 16.8 (0.8) 22.1 (3.1) 22.1 (5.0)
Age min., max. 16, 19 18, 37 17, 45
Number of decision trials 54 78 78
Deliberation condition levels Spontaneous vs. Deliberation Control vs. Deliberation Spontaneous vs. Control vs. Deliberation
Note. From the original 54 participants in Study 1, one participant was removed because the final questionnaire indicated an age below 16 years (local
age limit at which using the data would have required parental consent). From the original 54 participants in Study 2, one participant was removed
because the experimenter (a research assistant) indicated that the participant appeared to be intoxicated during participation in the study. One demo-
graphic questionnaire from Study 1 and three demographic questionnaires from Study 2 are missing due to a failure to retrieve them from a laboratory
computer before deletion; these data were coded as missing
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and to call the experimenter who checked the correctness of the
plan. In case of an incorrect plan, the experimenter repeated the
correct plan before the participant continued with the procedure.
Goal-commitment questions (Studies 2 and 3)
Commitment to the goal of making good decisions was rela-
tively high (mean of ~5 on a 7-point scale), and no outliers
were detected. Participants answered three goal-commitment
questions (plus one question regarding the response plan in
the deliberation manipulation conditions). The questions ad-
dressed participants’ commitment to making good decisions
in the upcoming task on a 7-point Likert scale anchored with 1
(disagree) and 7 (agree): “I am determined to make good
decisions”; “I really do not care about making good decisions”
(reverse coded); “It is important to me to make good deci-
sions”; and in the deliberation manipulation conditions, “I
am determined to implement the response plan.” Internal con-
sistency of the four commitment questions in the deliberation-
manipulation conditions showed a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.65
(Study 2) and 0.79 (Study 3). For the three commitment ques-
tions in the control conditions, the Cronbach’s alpha was 0.82
(Study 2) and 0.66 (Study 3). Due to the acceptable internal
consistency, a mean commitment score was created for each
participant. The mean commitment was relatively high (Study
2: M = 5.14, SD = 0.47; Study 3: M = 5.15, SD = 0.35), with
no individual outliers detected (Tukey boxplot method).
Decision paradigm
Stimulus presentation and response detection was controlled by
the open source software PsychoPy (Peirce et al., 2019).
Figure 1 depicts an image of the decision task layout. All the
information was presented in four white boxes. In the top box,
information on the total size of the negotiated resource
(endowment) was presented. A second box (the framing box)
below the endowment box informed the participants about the
owner of the currently negotiated resource. Below this framing
box, two squares (decision boxes) placed side by side informed
the participants about the to be negotiated share of the resource
and the respective probabilities. The letters D and K were
displayed to the left and right of the decision boxes to indicate
the respective response key. In preparation for the task, partic-
ipants were asked to place one finger of each corresponding
hand on the response keys (D and K, respectively) and start
the task whenever they were ready. Each participant completed
54 (Study 1) or 78 (Studies 2 & 3) decision trials. Each decision
trial had its own set of properties (combination of endowment,
probabilities, framing, etc.). Each participant completed the
same set of trials but the presentation order was randomized.
Decision framing One half of the trials was presented in a loss
frame, and the other half in a gain frame. Loss frames (gain
frames) were established by presenting the information of the
respective decision trial in a format that implied that the par-
ticipant will lose (gain) a part of the resource. This included
information that the participant is the owner (is not the owner)
of the currently negotiated resource by stating “Owner: You
(“Owner: Your opponent”). Furthermore, in the middle of the
pie charts illustrating the probability information, it was em-
phasized that the specified amount of the resource will be lost
(gained) when deciding for the respective option by stating
“You will lose” (“You will gain”).
Expected value The information presented in the decision
boxes varied systematically to establish three conditions dif-
fering in which response option had the higher expected value
(see Table B in the SupplementaryMaterial). Higher expected
value refers to the probability of receiving a higher outcome
when choosing a certain response. These probabilities were
manipulated to be either in favor of the safe option, the risky
option (see Fig. 1; in 10 hypothetical trials, the expected value
of always choosing the safe option would result in 40 points,
whereas always choosing the risky option would result in 48
points), or neither (i.e., equal; safe and risky option have the
same expected value). The higher expected value trials were
equally distributed within the total number of trials (Study 1:
18 trials per condition; Studies 2 and 3: 26 trials per condi-
tion), with the same amount of loss and gain framings.
Emphasis Studies 2 and 3 included an emphasis that a specific
subset of the decision trials was more important than others.
The heightened importance of these trials was implemented
by making them twice as likely to be chosen for the final
reward calculation. In Study 2, participants were informed
about these critical trials in written form during the general
task instructions. In Study 3, to increase its salience, the infor-
mation was repeated orally by the experimenter. The critical
trials were highlighted by a certain background color (blue or
orange, counterbalanced between participants) in Study 2, and
by an exclamation mark in Study 3.
The emphasis factor is not directly relevant for our main
reasoning. It merely concerns the effectiveness of our delibera-
tion manipulation. The emphasis factor was intended to create a
within-participant condition of more or less deliberation in em-
phasized versus nonemphasized trials. However, the data anal-
ysis indicated that the induction of more or less deliberation
spilled over to all decision trials (but see the Supplementary
Material for a more detailed analysis and some evidence for
cue-specific effects on decision times). This is not too surprising
considering the repetitive nature of the decision trials and the
rather artificial difference between the low and high emphasis
trials. As the emphasis factor—even if its implementation
would have been successful—does not affect our main conclu-
sions, this factor will only be considered where it is relevant to
the description of the methods or statistical analyses.
Psychon Bull Rev
Data preparation
We investigated mean proportions of risk responses and mean
response times per participants for each study by creating
boxplots. This method revealed no extreme values (i.e., values
beyondmean ±3×interquartile range), and thus no participants
were removed. Single decision trials were removed if re-
sponse times were below 500 ms or deviated by more than 3
standard deviations from the mean response time calculated
per participant. Due to these criteria, 4.93% of the trials in
Study 1, 2.64% from Study 2, and 2.56% from Study 3 were
removed.
With regard to the analysis strategy, we investigated par-
ticipants decisions with a general linear mixed model (glmer
and lmer function of the lme4 package for R; Bates, Mächler,
Bolker, &Walker, 2015) with the choice of the risky option as
the dependent variable. We entered expected value, framing,
deliberation, emphasis (Studies 2 & 3), their two-way interac-
tion effects and relevant three-way interaction effects as fixed
effects and the intercept of participants as random effect. The
p-value estimates were derived from Wald χ2 tests (Anova
function of the car package for R; Fox & Weisberg, 2011)
applied to the full model. Confidence intervals for the hypoth-
esis’ critical effects (see Figs. 3 & 4) were calculated from the
fitted model (i.e., excluding nonsignificant factors except for
those critical for our hypotheses; confint function of the stats
package for R; R Development Core Team, 2019).
Results (Studies 1–3)
Decision response times (deliberation manipulation check)
We consider response times as indicators of more or less de-
liberation. Thus, participants planning to respond spontane-
ously should show faster mean response times than partici-
pants planning to respond deliberately. The results of the full
model analyses of the response times are shown in Table A in
the Supplementary Material. At this point, we will focus only
on the relevant response time differences for the deliberation
condition. Overall, our assumption was confirmed. In Study 1,
participants planning to decide spontaneously responded
quicker (M = 5.55 s, SD = 3.83 s) than participants planning
to deliberate (M = 9.52 s, SD = 5.55 s), χ2(1) = 11.91, p = .001.
Similarly, in Study 3, participants planning to decide sponta-
neously responded quicker (M = 6.51 s, SD = 2.66 s) than
participants planning to deliberate (M = 11.02 s, SD = 4.79
s), with the control group falling in between (M = 9.88 s, SD =
5.07 s), χ2(2) = 7.47, p = .001. Only Study 2 did not provide
evidence for a difference between participants in the control
group (M = 8.46 s, SD = 4.30 s) and those planning to delib-
erate (M = 8.46, SD = 4.18), χ2(1) < 1, ns.
There are two features distinguishing Study 2 from Studies
1 and 3. The first concerns the design. In Study 2, we only
used a subset (control vs. deliberative) of the design that was
used in Studies 1 and 3. The second aspect concerns the
response-time data distribution. All three studies show an
overall distribution peak of response times around 5 s (see
the Supplementary Material for the respective histograms).
However, the data of the deliberating participants in Study 2
shows a second, very early peak between 0.5 and 1 s. A sim-
ilar early peak is only present for the spontaneous participants’
data (as intended), but not for any of the deliberating partici-
pants’ data of Studies 1 and 3. To sum up, overall, we have
evidence that our manipulations had the intended effect of
inducing a low versus high degree of deliberation. However,
any specific conclusions drawn from Study 2 must be taken
with caution as the response-time data appear to deviate from
the overall patterns found in Studies 1 and 3.
Decision analysis
The results of the full model analyses are presented in Table 2.
There are five consistent observations over all three studies:
Three of these observations concern aspects of the decision
paradigm (Manipulation Checks section), one observation
concerns the predicted Framing × Deliberation interaction
(Hypothesis-Critical Effect section), and a last observation
concerns the expected-value factor (Factor Unrelated to the
Dominant Response section).
Manipulation checks
All three studies (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics) showed
the expected framing effect, χ2(1) > 41.38, all ps < .001.
Participants were more likely to choose the risky option in
loss frame trials than in gain frame trials. Moreover, all three
studies showed a main effect of expected value, χ2(2) > 93.96,
all ps < .001. Participants chose the risky option more often if
the risky option had a higher expected value than when the
safe option had the higher expected value. The proportion of
risky responses in the trials with equal expected value fell in
between the other two. These two main effects were qualified
by a two-way interaction effect between expected value and
framing, χ2(2) > 10.90, all ps < .002. In all three studies, the
proportion of responses that were in line with the expected
value was greater in gain frame trials than in loss frame trials.
In sum, all manipulations affected participants’ behavior in the
expected way. The interaction between framing and expected
value was unexpected but does not pertain to any conclusions
related to how these factors interact with the deliberation ma-
nipulation as addressed in the following sections.
Deliberation × Framing interaction (hypothesis-critical effect)
We observed a consistent two-way interaction effect between
deliberation and framing, χ2(1/2) > 5.04, all ps < .025. As can
Psychon Bull Rev
be seen in the mean risk response proportions in Fig. 2 and the
confidence intervals in Fig. 3, a higher degree of deliberation
predicts a smaller framing effect. The observed two-way in-
teraction effects were not qualified by a higher-level three-
way interaction effect. In addition, the same Deliberation ×
Framing interaction effect was found when looking only at the
equal expected value trials (combined analysis of Studies 1, 2,
and 3), χ2(1) > 11.34, p < .001. This additional analysis
Table 2 Statistics regarding the full model analysis of the proportion of risk responses
Variable/study df χ2 p M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Emphasis Low High
Study 1 – – – – –
Study 2 1 2.46 .117 0.50 (0.16) 0.47 (0.19)
Study 3 1 2.93 .087 0.49 (0.16) 0.46 (0.16)
(Higher) expected value Safe Equal Risk
Study 1 2 93.96 <.001 0.39 (0.15) 0.49 (0.13) 0.60 (0.16)
Study 2 2 110.89 <.001 0.40 (0.17) 0.48 (0.16) 0.59 (0.18)
Study 3 2 227.76 <.001 0.36 (0.18) 0.48 (0.18) 0.60 (0.20)
Framing Gain Loss
Study 1 1 80.01 <.001 0.41 (0.16) 0.58 (0.18)
Study 2 1 41.38 <.001 0.44 (0.18) 0.54 (0.18)
Study 3 1 85.69 <.001 0.42 (0.18) 0.54 (0.21)
Deliberation Spon. Control Delib.
Study 1 1 10.99 <.001 0.55 (0.09) – 0.45 (0.11)
Study 2 1 0.39 .531 – 0.48 (0.13) 0.50 (0.18)
Study 3 2 1.17 .556 0.50 (0.18) 0.45 (0.16) 0.49 (0.12)
Emphasis × Expected Value
Study 1 – – –
Study 2 2 0.35 .839
Study 3 2 0.55 .761
Emphasis × Framing
Study 1 – – –
Study 2 1 1.31 .252
Study 3 1 1.28 .257
Emphasis × Deliberation
Study 1 – – –
Study 2 1 0.06 .805
Study 3 2 0.04 .982
Expected Value × Framing
Study 1 2 10.90 <.001
Study 2 2 13.00 .002
Study 3 2 19.55 <.001
Expected Value × Deliberation
Study 1 2 1.26 .532
Study 2 2 1.43 .490
Study 3 4 2.37 .667
Framing × Deliberation (see Fig. 2 for mean proportions)
Study 1 1 25.38 <.001
Study 2 1 5.04 .025
Study 3 2 12.72 .002
Note.Mean proportions and standard deviations were calculated from themeans per participant and the respective condition. Spon. = spontaneous; Cont.
= control; Delib. = deliberation
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reveals evidence for altered responses after deliberation (i.e.,
less dominant responses) even when deliberation did not al-
low for the insight that one of the response options was of
potentially greater worth. Apparently, the effect of delibera-
tion on framing (i.e., dominant responses) emerged indepen-
dently of the expected value factor. In sum, given that the
framing effect reflects dominant responses, our findings sug-
gest that more deliberation resulted in a decrease in the ex-
pression of dominant responses.
Expected value (factor unrelated to the dominant response)
Across all three studies, we found no expected Value ×
Deliberation interaction effect, χ2(2/4) < 2.37, all ps > .490.
Despite differences in decision times between the different
deliberation conditions and evidence that decisions were af-
fected by the deliberation conditions (as reflected in the
Framing × Deliberation interaction effect), we found no com-
parable effects of different degrees of deliberation on
Fig. 3 95% confidence intervals for the Framing × Deliberation interaction effect for the five possible tests of comparing the framing effect with the





















































































Fig. 2 Framing × Deliberation interaction effect for Studies 1 to 3 (whiskers represent the standard error of the mean)
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considering the expected-value information (the
confidence intervals of each possible comparison are
displayed in Fig. 4). Even though conclusions drawn from
null results can be problematic, the overall pattern of re-
sults is in line with our hypothesis that deliberation reduces
the likelihood of expressing dominant responses: We
found differences in decision outcomes after deliberation
for the framing manipulation. We argued that the framing
manipulation entails a salient dominant response, and thus
the likelihood of showing this dominant response could be
reduced. However, we did not find a comparable effect for
the expected value manipulation, a manipulation that we
argued did not entail a salient dominant response. Thus,
with no salient dominant response accessible, the proposed
mechanism that reduces the likelihood of expressing dom-
inant responses had no target (we will highlight a similar
observation in research using the ultimatum game and the
so-called investment game in the Discussion of the
Theoretical Relevance section).
Discussion of empirical findings
Our data from three independent studies provide five consis-
tent observations. First, in line with previous research (De
Martino et al., 2006), we found the predicted framing effect.
In loss frame trials, participants chose the risky option more
often than the safe option. Second, and most critically, we
predicted deliberation would decrease the likelihood of show-
ing the framing effect (i.e., expressing the dominant response).
Consistently across all three studies and five individual tests,
conditions in which we induced a higher degree of delibera-
tion showed a smaller framing effect (see Figs. 2 & 3).
Considering that the framing effect constitutes the dominant-
response pattern, conditions of higher degrees of deliberation
showed fewer expressions of dominant responses.
Third, if the risky option had a comparatively higher ex-
pected value, it was more likely to be chosen compared with
the safe option; and if the safe option had the higher expected
value, the risky option was less likely to be chosen. Thus,
across all studies, responses consistently reflected effects of
the available information on expected value. This indicates
that the expected value information that had to be extracted
from a combination of probability and outcome value infor-
mation was processed in a way that it affected participants’
responses. Fourth, the considerable effect of expected value
was nonetheless consistently qualified by an interaction with
the framing manipulation. In all three studies, the effect of
expected value (i.e., higher likelihood of choosing the risky
option if it had a higher expected value than the safe option)
was smaller for loss frames than for gain frames. There are
different ways of interpreting this effect. Most relevant to our
Fig. 4 95% confidence intervals for the Expected Value × Deliberation interaction effect for the five possible tests of comparing the expected value
manipulation (excluding the equal expected value condition) with the low versus high deliberation conditions
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present concern, it provides evidence that the implementation
of the expected-value manipulation was sensitive to other
decision-relevant factors. This is important to consider when
evaluating the fifth and last consistent observation: We have
no evidence (or very little; see Fig. 4 for the confidence
intervals of five analyses testing the effect) that the degree of
deliberation had an effect on how much the expected value
information influenced the decision. From perspectives that
relate deliberation or reflective processing to more normative,
rule-based, and consequential decision-making (as compared
with biased, associative, and experiential; reviewed by Evans
& Stanovich, 2013), we could have predicted—and did so
before the results of the first study made us consider the pres-
ent theoretical perspective—that the induction of deliberation
(i.e., “thinking carefully”) increased participants’ consider-
ation of the normative, rule-based, and consequential informa-
tion (i.e., expected value). This, however, was not the case. As
drawing a definite conclusion from a nonsignificant result is
problematic (e.g., Dienes, 2011, p. 282), it is more worthwhile
to highlight the exemplary purpose of varying expected value.
We varied expected value independently from the decision
framing that we predicted to determine the dominant response.
In the next section, we provide a range of examples where this
independence between variables that determine the dominant
response and other decision-relevant variables is not given.
Thus, conclusions about these other variables are confounded
with those that affect dominant responses. In our present stud-
ies, we avoided such confounding and detected independent
consequences. Deliberation affected the expression of the
dominant responses (framing effect), even when analyzing
only trials in which the risky and the safe option had equal
expected values. However, we have no reliable evidence that
deliberation affected expected-value considerations—a vari-
able that in comparison with the decision framing is less likely
to evoke a dominant response (for a summary of the response
time data and a note on the specificity of the planning
procedure, see the Supplementary Material).
Discussion of the theoretical relevance
In the present research, we explored the idea that one conse-
quence of deliberation is reducing the likelihood of expressing
dominant responses. Critically, we proposed that this conse-
quence is driven by a mechanism relating to the decision
context—what is the dominant response and what alternatives
are available—instead of a mechanism related to characteris-
tics of the deliberation process itself. Our discussion section
will focus on two implications of this proposal: first, its con-
sequences for the (re)interpretation of prior studies investigat-
ing characteristics of deliberation, and second, for understand-
ing how the cognitive system implements nondominant
responses and the distinction between automatic and con-
trolled behavior.
Context characteristics of the decision task
In the following section, we will provide examples of how our
theoretical perspective aligns with previous empirical findings
while offering a novel interpretation. A critical aspect of our
evaluation of previous studies is that there are always system-
atic relations between dominant responses and further deci-
sion characteristics. These links can have two directions:
Normatively low decision quality is linked to the dominant-
response option or normatively high decision quality is linked
to the dominant-response option.
The dominant response has low decision quality
We already mentioned decision-making studies with children
as participants (e.g., Diamond et al., 2002; Riviére & Lécuyer,
2003). In these studies, the participants were confronted with a
context in which habitual responses (i.e., dominant response;
saying the word “day” in response to a picture of the sun) were
wrong and the alternative, less dominant, response option
(saying the word “night”) was correct. The authors observed
more correct responses after inducing a response delay. This
could merely be a consequence of a mechanism that reduced
the likelihood of expressing the dominant response. A similar
argument can be made for studies from our own laboratory
(Doerflinger et al., 2017). In a poker-like game, we presented
participants with a decision to continue with a previously cho-
sen course of action (i.e., dominant response) or to stop.
Stopping did not only contradict the participants’ previous
decision but also resulted in a sure loss of a previously
invested resource. Committing to such a sure loss would result
in higher outcomes whenever the likelihood of winning was
low (i.e., normatively better decision). Inducing deliberation
whenever the likelihood of winning was low (Doerflinger
et al., 2017, Study 2) increased the likelihood of stopping.
Again, these seemingly better decisions following delibera-
tion can be explained by a mechanism that merely decreases
the likelihood of expressing the dominant response (i.e., con-
tinued investment)—with the better decision (stopping invest-
ment) being the only available alternative to the dominant
response of continuing to invest.
The following two examples have a similar setup with
dominant responses being the lower quality decision.
However, they are noteworthy because our framework can
explain additional aspects of the observed results. For exam-
ple, Neo, Yu, Weber, and Gonzalez (2013) found that induc-
ing a delay (i.e., creating the possibility for more deliberation)
changed the participants’ response pattern in the ultimatum
game, but not in the so-called investment game. Rejecting
unfair offers in the ultimatum game has been linked to
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affective processes (e.g., Sanfey, 2003). Thus, rejecting unfair
offers constitutes the dominant response. In line with our
framework, deliberation (induced by a delay) reduced the like-
lihood of expressing the dominant response (i.e., rejecting
unfair offers) in the ultimatum game (Grimm & Mengel,
2011; Neo et al., 2013). Neo et al. (2013) argued that in com-
parison to the ultimatum game, decisions in the investment
game are based on more complex interactions of different
motives. From our perspective, this means that the investment
game does not have a clear dominant response. Thus, in line
with our reasoning that the effects of deliberation operate on
mechanisms related to the dominant response, inducing delib-
eration in a context with no clear dominant response will not
systematically change the decision outcomes. This—a null
effect—was what Neo et al. observed when inducing deliber-
ation in the investment game.
Finally, Obrecht and Chesney (2016) report a study in
which inducing deliberation reduced the likelihood of decid-
ing in line with a stereotypical response (i.e., a dominant
response; reviewed by Devine & Sharp, 2009) in favor of
base-rate information (i.e., probability information on the like-
lihood of an outcome)—the only available alternative.
Importantly, this finding was independent of whether the de-
liberation instructions pointed participants’ deliberation to-
wards the base-rate information or the stereotypical informa-
tion. From a saliency perspective, it could be predicted that
response options that are in line with the highlighted content
of the deliberation process are favored. That is, highlighting
base-rate information should increase the use of base-rate
information and highlighting stereotypical information
should increase the use of stereotypical information for the
decision at hand. However, the pattern of results observed
by Obrecht and Chesney (2016) is more in line with our the-
oretical framework: Deliberation (i.e., delay) reduced the like-
lihood of expressing the dominant response (i.e., the
stereotype-based option) in favor of the only available alter-
native (i.e., the response option that was set up to be in line
with the base-rate information).
In sum, these studies qualify as examples in which delib-
eration (or response delays) produced a range of different—
often normatively better—choices. However, these effects of
deliberation on decisions are potentially a mere conse-
quence of a mechanism that reduces the likelihood of
expressing the dominant response and the fact that the
respective task characteristics were set up in a way that
the only available alternative was the better choice. Not
surprisingly, studies investigating this dominance/low-
decision-quality setup are quite frequent because they
investigate situations in which people make numerous
errors. However, our theoretical framework becomes es-
pecially intriguing if it manages to explain results in
which the dominance-quality dimension is reversed.
We deal with this in the following section.
The dominant response has high decision quality
One context in which the dominant response is associated
with a high decision quality are those in which an immediately
available affective response (i.e., dominant response; a feeling
of positivity or negativity) towards an object or event provides
a good basis for a decision. Wilson et al. (1993) assessed
choices to pick a poster that participants would hang up in
their living room and measured their satisfaction with it after
a few weeks. The choice of a poster that has no other practical
value than to be visually pleasing to the owner is a choice that
is probably based on the decision maker’s immediate, affec-
tive response towards it (i.e., dominant response).
Deliberation about the decision should lead to choices that
rely less on this immediate affective, dominant response, and
therefore lead to a “worse” decision. This is exactly what the
results showed with respect to the participants’ satisfaction
with the poster after a few weeks. Participants who were
instructed to deliberate on the decision were less satisfied with
their choice than were participants who were not instructed to
deliberate (Wilson et al., 1993). Similar evidence has been
presented about preference consistency (Nordgren &
Dijksterhuis, 2009) and the topic of motor skills and deliber-
ation (Flegal & Anderson, 2008). Note that this list does not
include seemingly related studies on the so-called
deliberation-without-attention effect (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Bos,
Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006). Besides doubts regarding the
empirical evidence of studies on this topic (see Newell &
Rakow, 2011), we believe that typically used tasks to investi-
gate the deliberation-without-attention effect are not informa-
tive for evaluating our present proposal, as they are missing a
clear dominant response (see also the Related Research
section).
Overall, however, if the used decision tasks included clear
dominant responses that led to high-quality decisions, induc-
ing deliberation has been shown to reduce the quality of deci-
sion outcomes (e.g., Wilson et al., 1993). This outcome is in
line with our present perspective, and it highlights the merit of
our perspective regarding the much-debated question of
whether deliberation is beneficial for decision-making or not
(e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004). From our perspective, the answer is
not based on the mechanisms of deliberation, but on the re-
spective context. If the dominant response is the normatively
wrong response, then deliberation—resulting in the decreased
likelihood of expressing that dominant response—is benefi-
cial. If the dominant response is the normatively good re-
sponse, then deliberation is more likely to interfere with ex-
pressing this good response.
Limitations of the present framework
Before extending our scope beyond decision-making re-
search, we will highlight some limitations of the present
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perspective. These limitations pertain to the absence of a dom-
inant response in a decision context, the amount of ambiguity
that a decision context is associated with, and the question of
where a decision episode ends.
The absence of a universal dominant response
If the decision maker does not have a dominant response for
the given decision context, the processes described in the
present article will predict no effect of deliberation (i.e., no
difference in decision outcomes following more or less delib-
eration). Furthermore, outcomes of experimental studies are
usually evaluated based on condition-wise aggregations of a
participant sample. For a given context, different individuals
can have different dominant responses (e.g., due to different
learning experiences). Each individual might follow the pat-
tern that deliberationmerely reduces the likelihood of express-
ing dominant responses. However, the aggregation of the in-
dividually different tendencies can result in finding no differ-
ences in the aggregated condition effects. Thus, from the per-
spective of evaluating the outcomes of experimental decision-
making studies, our approach allows to make predictions for
setups in which dominant responses are a rather universal
tendency. Such universal tendencies can have different roots.
They can be based on certain motives that are rather funda-
mental (e.g., wanting to avoid losses) or learning experiences
that are shared by most individuals within a given culture
(e.g., certain stereotypes).
Decision context ambiguity
Our present perspective does not offer systematic predictions
whenever various mechanisms (including the one providing
the dominant response) favor the same response. Consider for
example Study 3 in Doerflinger et al. (2017): Participants
planned to deliberate whenever the available information
changed (i.e., a new poker card turning up). The likelihood
of expressing the dominant response (i.e., continuing with the
previously chosen course of action) was not reduced by delib-
eration if that dominant response was also linked to a high
chance of winning (based on the probabilities of the provided
numerical information). Basically, all available information—
the immediately accessible dominant response to continue to
invest and the response provided by a less dominant mecha-
nism of calculating one’s chances of winning—pointed to-
wards the same response of continuing to invest. Thus, the
deliberation-induced decay of the immediately available re-
sponse (i.e., continue to invest) is likely to be prevented by
later emerging evidence in favor of the same response. Such
situations of various mechanisms favoring a single response
could be understood as a situation with low ambiguity. Thus,
it appears that to make clear predictions from our present
framework, at least some degree of ambiguity is required.
Boundaries of a decision episode
The evaluation of our present framework in relation to other
studies requires a careful consideration of what constitutes a
decision episode. For example, there is research in which par-
ticipants first indicate an initial decision and then deliberation
is induced by giving the participants the chance to reconsider
their initial choice (e.g., Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006). The
general tendency to maintain the initial choice (reviewed by
Sleesman, Conlon,McNamara, &Miles, 2012) and not switch
to an alternative response might be considered as evidence
against our present proposal. However, we believe that such
a study setup needs to be evaluated as having two decision
episodes: making an initial choice and rethinking a previously
made choice. The decision options change between these two
episodes from “chose A or B” to “chose whether you want to
maintain your previous choice or switch to the alternative.”
These changed characteristics can result in having different
dominant responses in each episode (e.g., Option A is the
dominant response in the first episode, whereas maintaining
the previous choice is the dominant response in the second
episode). Consequently, rather than interpreting the outcome
of the request to rethink as being informative of the psycho-
logical mechanisms of deliberation, this outcome may again
just reflect the expression of another dominant response (i.e.,
maintaining a previously chosen course of action). The overall
numbers of 72% and 88% sticking to their initial choice in
Shynkaruk and Thompson (2006) and research on the so-
called escalation of commitment phenomenon (Sleesman
et al., 2012) seem to be in line with this interpretation. To
investigate the mechanisms of deliberation it is not sufficient
to compare the responses in the initial, first decision episode to
the responses in the second, rethinking episode. Instead, it
requires an experimental manipulation of the rethinking epi-
sode into a short versus long rethinking episode. Based on our
own previous research (Doerflinger et al., 2017), we are con-
fident in predicting that such a setup would result in a pattern
that is in line with our present theoretical perspective. In a
short rethinking episode, more participants would stick to
their previous choice (i.e., expressing the dominant response),
and comparably fewer participants would express this domi-
nant response (i.e., more switching) in a long rethinking
episode.
In general, our discussion of what constitutes a decision
episode highlights that our conceptual framework is not sug-
gesting a “strategy” on how to best make complex,
multiattribute decisions (e.g., extensive “elaboration” on what
car to buy or which college to attend). Complex decisions are
likely to span many decision episodes, and giving such deci-
sions some thought is probably wise (see Newell, 2015). The
outcomes of such complex decisions are most likely based on
a multitude of different cognitive mechanisms. Instead, our
present framework focuses on the psychological mechanisms
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within the many individual decision episodes that constitute
the continuous sequence of everyday behaviors (e.g., habitu-
ally grabbing a chocolate muffin in the cafeteria versus delib-
erating and turning to the less habitual response of grabbing an
apple; responding with affectively driven verbal or physical
aggression when being provoked versus deliberating and
showing a nonaggressive less dominant response). Within
each of these episodes, our framework provides predictions
and explanations of how nondominant response are
expressed.
Will the real cognitive mechanism of deliberation please
stand up
We want to be clear that we do not claim that our proposed
mechanism is the only one that produces decision outcomes
following deliberation. We rather assume that it is a series of
processes that are most likely active during deliberation. The
previously described boundaries of the present proposal, how-
ever, highlight potential beneficial future directions for
deliberation-focused research. Previous and current research
on decision-making seems to have a strong focus on situations
with clear dominant responses—especially if these dominant
responses are normatively of low quality. This focus is rea-
sonable when aiming to better understand the mechanisms
that make responses dominant or when trying to help individ-
uals to make better decisions. However, when the interest is in
understanding the (higher) cognitive mechanisms of delibera-
tion, we believe that it is not the best possible approach. It
involves the potential that observed decision outcomes are
erroneously attributed to “higher” level cognitive mechanisms
of deliberation instead of the “lower” level processes de-
scribed in the present research. Using a context that does not
include dominant responses should be more informative for
understanding deliberation, because it involves less of a risk to
confound “lower” and “higher” level mechanisms.
It is noteworthy that there are various studies that
resulted in null effect findings when deliberation was
manipulated in a context that we would characterize as
not including dominant responses (e.g., investment
game; Neo et a l . , 2013; some studies on the
deliberation-without-attention effect, Newell & Rakow,
2011; or the expected value manipulation in our present
studies). Although there are issues involved in drawing
conclusions from null effects, should such null effects
appear rather systematically in situations with no clear
dominant responses, this would raise questions regard-
ing the assumption that qualitatively different mecha-
nisms are at work in early versus later, more deliberate
decisions (see also De Neys & Pennycook, 2019). This
also highlights another important limitation of the pres-
ent article. We do not provide a systematic review of
previous studies. Our present focus is on presenting a
theoretical framework that, at the very least, provides
insights into alternative interpretations of the previously
discussed studies. Based on the present theorizing, how-
ever, more systematic analyses are warranted that exam-
ine decision outcomes following deliberation with a fo-
cus on whether the investigated context involved domi-
nant responses or not, and whether conclusions were
drawn based on paradigms including either a single or
multiple decision episodes.
Another important limitation of the theoretical perspective
presented so far will be addressed in the next and final section
of this article. So far, we have provided a simplified view that
was focused on decision-making research in which alternative
response options are often provided with the decision task. In
the next section, we will broaden this perspective beyond
decision-making research and illustrate how our present con-
ceptual framework is informative regarding the more general
question of how the cognitive system implements nondomi-
nant responses. To foreshadow our central conclusion, we
assume that the same mechanisms that provide the dominant
response are also responsible for providing the alternative, less
dominant responses if they are given the necessary time (e.g.,
due to deliberation) to unfold.
Controlled processes versus giving
associations the time to unfold
In this last section, we will return to the question raised at the
beginning of the article: Do decisions outcomes following
deliberation have to be attributed to qualitatively different
mechanisms than the outcome of quickly made decisions? A
basic assumption of the so-called cognitive revolution in psy-
chology is that the complexity of human behavior cannot
solely be explained by mechanisms we defined here as pro-
ducing dominant responses like associative learning and af-
fective prioritization (e.g., Miller, 2003). Control
processes (e.g., Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) are typical-
ly evoked to explain observations that an organism ex-
presses behaviors that go beyond dominant responses—
apparently implemented by the organism’s “will” (even
if nowadays it is not referred to as “will” anymore;
Hommel, 2019). The central proposal of our present
research is that merely by inducing a response delay,
deliberation systematically influences response out-
comes. This is not only relevant in cases where alterna-
tive responses are provided by a researcher in a
decision-making paradigm but also if response alterna-
tives must be produced by the decision maker. The cen-
tral idea is that alternatives are not produced by a dif-
ferent system, but instead by the continuation of the
mechanisms that also provided the early, dominant re-
sponses. We will illustrate this idea based on associative
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learning as an important mechanism producing dominant
responses.
An example of an associative activation chain
Associative learning mechanisms are often discussed merely
at the stimulus (S1)–response (R1) level because R1 is typi-
cally executed. However, if R1 is prepared but not executed
due to the initiation of deliberation, there is reason to believe
that associative spreading of activation continues. In other
words, the preparation of R1 can in turn act as a trigger of
further concepts; for example, typically perceived conse-
quences of R1. Such associative chains (S1–R1–S2–R2; or
simulations) are described in detail in Hesslow (2012).
Empirically, there is ample evidence that responses (or their
preparation) are not necessarily the end of the associative
learning and activation mechanisms. For example, responses
can be associatively linked to their observable effects (e.g.,
Elsner & Hommel, 2001) and a broad range of indirect evi-
dence suggests that response preparation can activate such
effect anticipations (reviewed by Hesslow, 2012). These an-
ticipated effects will themselves continue to trigger further
associated concepts or responses.
Consider the following example of an individual’s learning
experiences. The perception of chocolate muffins (S1) is typ-
ically followed by the consumption of a muffin (R1), making
R1 a well-learned, habitual response. Assume that in addition
to this strong habit, the person makes some novel experiences
due to an increased concern about health. From time to time,
the consumption of a muffin (R1) is followed by feelings of
regret (S2) for having eaten something unhealthy. Such feel-
ings of regret (S2) are usually followed by suppressing the
consumption of (more) unhealthy food (R2).
Eventually, if the health concerns remain a chronic goal,
the muffins (S1) may at some point become directly linked to
“regret” (S2) and consumption suppression (R2; see
Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999). However,
importantly from our present perspective, for a very long
time—or forever if the health concerns do not become or
remain a chronic goal—consumption (R1) will remain the
most dominant response to the muffins (S1). Regret (S2) and
consumption suppression (R2) will remain weak associations
linked to the consumption response (R1). Consequently, re-
garding our focus on deliberation, the full chain of associa-
tions can only unfold when enough time is at hand.
Deliberation time is required in which the consumption re-
sponse (R1) is prepared—but not executed—and secondary
associations can unfold (R1->S2), leading to the consumption
suppression response (S2->R2). If this time is not granted, it is
likely that the associative chain stops earlier with the expres-
sion of the first available response (consumption, R1). Each
single step in the chain is the most dominant response with
respect to its trigger (S1->R1, R1->S2, S2->R2). Thus, there
are no magical leaps that are beyond prior learning experi-
ences. From an observer perspective, however, the observa-
tion of the expression of R2 (consumption suppression) in
response to S1 (muffins) is the expression of a less dominant
response as the obvious learning experience of the individual
suggests that R1 (consumption) would have been the most
dominant response.
Choosing the most parsimonious model
Based on this example, do we require assumptions of “cogni-
tive control” to explain the full range of observable behavior?
More specific, are there reasons—beyond conventions to label
things for communicative purposes—why the associatively
activated inhibition of a response at the second level of the
activation chain (see also Verbruggen & Logan, 2008) should
receive a qualitatively different label (e.g., “control process”)
from the equally associatively activated response at the first
level of the activation chain (labelled “automatic”)? Beyond
this particular example, is it necessary to assume qualitative
differences between external (S1) and internal stimuli (prepa-
ration of R1 and S2) when they are all processed in the brain—
most likely even in the same sensorimotor areas of the brain
(Barsalou, 1999)—and all are subject to associative learning?
We approach theory development from the perspective of
statistical model development. Assuming qualitative differ-
ences in cognitive mechanisms between deliberation and no
deliberation, control and automaticity, and internal and exter-
nal response control significantly increases the amount of as-
sumptions (more parameters making a model less parsimoni-
ous). Considerable evidence is required to justify this increase
in assumptions. We believe that our present perspective—
deliberation inducing delays that allow dominant-response
mechanisms to unfold beyond the “first” dominant
response—significantly lowers the necessity for assuming a
less parsimonious model of the cognitive system.
Related research
So far, we have not discussed the question of what triggers
deliberation. However, our present perspective highlights the
importance of this question and the research focused on its
investigation. Whether deliberation is triggered or not may
prove to be more relevant for understanding response out-
comes than the actual mechanisms of deliberation.
Regarding our present perspective, it is the question of wheth-
er deliberation is triggered or not that determines whether
dominant responses are expressed or their likelihood is re-
duced. Conflict detection mechanisms (e.g., Botvinick,
Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999) and the interactions
between conflict, affect, and effort mobilization (reviewed by
Dignath, Eder, Steinhauser, & Kiesel, 2020) may be the prime
Psychon Bull Rev
candidates for answering the question of when deliberation
can be expected to occur.
As laid out in the Introduction, the idea that delays lead to
the decay of the activation level of dominant responses has
been proposed previously (e.g., Simpson et al., 2012).
However, our present proposal extends this assumption in
two ways: First, we link the idea of delays and dominant-
response decay to deliberation. Deliberation acts as the
delay-inducing factor in everyday situations that corresponds
to the experimentally induced delays in laboratory studies.
Second, we reevaluate prior studies investigating deliberation
in decision-making research and conclude that the delay/
dominant-response decay perspective suffices to explain a
range of previous empirical observations.
Many of the ideas that are expressed in the present research
are influenced by related research, and only in combination can
they provide a full view of the perspective that we envision for
the cognitive system. In the area of decision-making, De Neys
and Pennycook (2019) have highlighted the problems with clas-
sical dichotomous thinking of intuition and deliberation. From an
action-control perspective, Hommel (2019) has questioned the
idea of qualitative differences between automaticity and control.
Comparable criticism has been raised about top-down and
bottom-up control of visual attention (Awh, Belopolsky, &
Theeuwes, 2012). More generally related to our emphasis on
associative-learning mechanisms, Abrahamse, Braem,
Notebaert, and Verguts (2016) attempted to explain cognitive
control by associative learning alone.
Finally, we need to differentiate our approach from pro-
posals that may appear similar. For example, Dijksterhuis
et al.’s (2006) unconscious thought theory (or deliberation-
without-attention effect) includes a novel mechanism to ex-
plain certain deliberation/delay effects on decision-making.
Empirically, paradigms typically used to investigate the
deliberation-without-attention effect are not necessarily infor-
mative to evaluate our present proposal. This is mainly be-
cause the investigated context (e.g., processing novel charac-
teristics of a previously unfamiliar product) is usually insuffi-
cient to establish a dominant response for one of the choices.
Consequently, our present perspective does not predict differ-
ences between the typically investigated deliberation/delay
conditions. The absence of a strong dominant response is a
critical difference to the previously discussed studies that also
investigated delays but involved strong dominant responses
(e.g., day–night task; Simpson et al., 2012).
Furthermore, there are differences on a theoretical level.
Rather than proposing a novel mechanism, we combined pre-
viously knownmechanisms (e.g., stimulus–response learning,
dissipation of the activation level of not executed responses,
cognitive simulation) in a novel way. This allowed us to distil
a parsimonious mechanism underlying the phenomenon that
individuals sometimes appear to express nondominant re-
sponses (see also Martiny-Huenger, Martiny, Parks-Stamm,
Pfeiffer, & Gollwitzer, 2017, for research with the same
aim). Finally, we do not make claims that the processes de-
scribed in the present research provide better or worse deci-
sion outcomes. They provide outcomes that depend on the
characteristics of the given situation and prior learning
experiences.
Conclusion
Kahneman (e.g., 2002) compared intuition (i.e., the saliency
of a response that is favored by dominant-response mecha-
nisms) with perception. We believe that this is a fitting meta-
phor. However, we argue that deliberation and deliberation
outcomes are comparable with perception as well. The differ-
ence in intuition (or automaticity) and deliberation is not in the
mechanism, but in “perceiving” something only shortly versus
remaining focused on the perception for some time. This per-
spective led us to propose that a general consequence of de-
liberation is to decreases the likelihood of expressing domi-
nant responses. Rather passive processes are the basis of this
effect. Following an event, deliberation induces a response
delay. This delay leads to the decay of the activation of early
available, dominant responses while allowing dominant-
response mechanisms to continue to produce alternative re-
sponses that eventually reach the execution threshold.
Empirically, we demonstrated this effect in a paradigm that
serves as an exemplary study setup and avoids overlap of
dominant responses with other decision-relevant variables.
Methodologically, the current research can be considered a
cautionary call to not confuse the characteristics of response
options favored by deliberation with the mechanisms of delib-
eration as they can be confounded with the task context.
Finally, the described phenomenon allows for understanding
behavioral flexibility (expressing nondominant responses)
without the notion of voluntary control.
The data for all experiments are available (https://osf.io/
wp6eh/?view_only=2d701734309a433b9122a4b4443bc40a).
None of the studies was preregistered.
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